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Introduction
Increasing insured losses that have been induced by severe natural catastrophes during the last decades brought up the problem that traditional reinsurance has not been sucient due to capacity shortage. Several alternative instruments came up to give remedy to capacity shortage on reinsurance markets (Cummins and Weiss (2009) ). CAT bonds are of particular importance among these instruments. They secure natural catastrophes by reducing coupon or principal payments when a certain natural catastrophe occurs in a certain region. In 2011 the amount of total risk capital of CAT bonds was USD 11.89 billion (Carpenter (2012) ). It is assumed that the CAT bond market will continue to grow in the future (Cummins and Weiss (2009) ). An important condition for successful trading of securities is the determination of accurate prices. However, because CAT bonds are not standardized, it is a challenging question how to price CAT bonds accurately. There can be various factors that inuence the risk premium that is required by investors. For instance, it is usually assumed that the chosen trigger mechanism or the peril aect the CAT bond premium. However, in the literature there are only few empirical studies that analyze on relatively small data sets which factors determine the CAT bond premium.
Moreover, it is widely unknown how CAT bond premiums react to natural catastrophes and particularly to nancial crises. Against this background, we analyze the reaction of CAT bond premiums after such events. Moreover, we examine which factors inuence CAT bond premiums.
The occurrence of a catastrophe is measured by a trigger mechanism that denes the default of the bond. The sponsor who wants to insure against specic catastrophe losses typically does not issue the CAT bond itself but uses a special purpose vehicle (SPV) as an intermediator. The SPV acts as a kind of insurer for the sponsor and issues CAT bonds to investors. The sponsor needs to pay premiums to the SPV. Expressed in simplied terms, the SPV pays these premiums above LIBOR to investors as part of coupon payments.
The premium consists of the expected loss (EL) and a risk premium and can be modeled by premium calculation principles.
There exist several modeling approaches for CAT bond premiums in the literature, namely linear models, loglinear models and the Wang transformation model (Lane and Mahul (2008) ; Major and Kreps (2003) ; Wang (2000) ). There is evidence that the linear model is an appropriate approach to describe and to predict CAT bond premiums (Galeotti et al. (2012) ). Subsequently, we present a brief review of empirical ndings regarding CAT bond premiums. Berge (2005) analyzes a linear approach and identies, for instance, the number of perils as a signicant premium determining factor. He analyzed CAT bond issue data from 1994 to 2004. Lane and Mahul (2008) use issue data as well as secondary market data of CAT bonds in order to establish cross-sectional analyses at dierent points in time. They nd that the risk premium is higher for Wind perils in the United States than for other peril types. Dieckmann (2011) analyzes secondary market data in the surrounding eld of hurricane Katrina. Therefore, he analyzes 61 CAT bonds with observations between 3/31/2005 and 03/31/2006. He identies, for instance, the applied trigger mechanism as a premium determining factor. Furthermore, he nds that premiums were signicantly higher after hurricane Katrina than before. Finally, Galeotti et al. (2012) nd that (a multiple of ) EL is sucient in order to forecast the CAT bond premiums at issue by analyzing a data set of CAT bonds issued between 1999 and 2009. They could not identify that including CAT bond specic variables leads to improvements of out-of-sample results.
Even if there already exist some empirical analyses on CAT bond premiums, there are a few drawbacks. First, several empirical ndings stay in conict with each other.
For instance, Berge (2005) does not nd any signicant inuence of the applied trigger mechanism on the CAT bond premium, whereas Dieckmann (2011) nds that CAT bonds using an indemnity trigger are imposed by investors with a higher risk premium than non-indemnity triggered CAT bonds. The reason could be that the empirical analyses are largely based on rather small samples. Thus, additional analyses on larger data sets are important. Second, there is little knowledge about the impact of natural catastrophes on CAT bond premiums. Third, to the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical analysis about the impact of nancial crises on CAT bond premiums. The reaction of premiums on natural catastrophes and nancial crises is important for investors for the following reason. While the motivation for the sponsor of issuing a CAT bond lies in catastrophe risk insurance, it is often stated that it is advantageous for investors to buy CAT bonds due to diversication eects. These result from low correlations to other securities that are traded on capital markets. The events of hurricane Katrina and the recent nancial crisis questioned this assumption. It is widely agreed in the literature that if a natural mega-catastrophe occurs, both the CAT bond market and the capital markets are aected and correlation develops (Cummins and Weiss (2009) ). However, it is not apparent how the CAT bond market reacts concretely. There could be an increase of premiums for all types of perils due to a generally increased risk aversion of market participants or there might be an increase of premiums that insure against perils of the same type as the occurred catastrophe. For the case of nancial crises, the dependency between the event and the CAT bond market is not apparent. Two situations are possible. The CAT bond market might be independent of capital market developments even if a nancial crisis occurs, or a nancial crisis could aect not only the capital markets but also the CAT bonds market, e.g. due to a general increased risk aversion of market participants.
Against this background, our main research questions are:
• Which factors determine the premium of a CAT bond?
• How do natural catastrophes or nancial crises inuence the CAT bond premium?
We analyze these research questions using a data set of secondary market CAT bond premiums from 2002 to 2012. This is virtually the whole data set that is available for secondary market CAT bond premiums. Considering CAT bond specic information, we nd that there is no signicant inuence of the applied trigger mechanism on the premium. This is in contrast to the widespread expectation in the literature, but it can be explained by a special payment structure included in most indemnity triggered CAT bonds. Thereby, both sponsor and investor share the risk proportionally above the trigger level. Addressing perils, we nd that if the number of insured peril regions or peril types increases, also the premium increases due to higher deal complexity. Furthermore, we nd that if the rating declines, the CAT bond premium increases. Thus, investors use rating information for their investment decision. Finally, we cannot nd any empirical evidence for a liquidity premium measured by maturity and volume of the CAT bond.
Analyzing macroeconomic factors, catastrophe events, and the nancial crisis, we nd that there is a signicantly positive dependency between the development of reinsurance premiums and CAT bond premiums. This can be explained by market imperfections and by the fact that CAT bonds are an alternative to traditional reinsurance. In addition, we verify that there is a dependency between capital markets and the CAT bond market measured by means of credit spreads of corporate bonds. We nd that this dependency grows signicantly in the course of the nancial crisis. Thus, we can conclude that the nancial crisis has an important inuence on CAT bond premiums. Finally, we nd that a natural mega-catastrophe such as hurricane Katrina results in higher premiums for hurricane perils only. Thus, market participants do not react to hurricane Katrina with a general distrust in the reported expected losses. Instead, the risk perception for hurricanes rises.
This study makes the following contributions: First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the rst empirical study that analyzes the impact of the nancial crisis on CAT bond premiums. Second, we provide new insights into the reaction of investors after natural catastrophes. Third, our results improve the understanding which factors inuence the premiums of CAT bonds.
The procedure of the paper is as follows. The research hypotheses are derived in Section 2, where we consider CAT bond specic hypotheses as well as macroeconomic and event hypotheses. In Section 3 the data set for the empirical analysis is presented. We present and discuss the results of our empirical analysis in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Hypotheses
In the literature, there is a discussion about the factors that determine the CAT bond premium. In the following, we describe CAT bond specic factors that are possible determining factors of the CAT bond premium. Subsequently, we discuss the possible inuence of macroeconomic factors and catastrophe events. In the course of the discussion, we derive several hypotheses on premium determining factors and on the reaction of CAT bond premiums on catastrophe events.
CAT Bond Specic Hypotheses
Typically, the default of a CAT bond is measured by a trigger mechanism. Trigger mechanisms can be separated into indemnity triggers and non-indemnity triggers. Nonindemnity triggers can further be divided into parametric (index) triggers, industry index triggers, modeled loss triggers and hybrid triggers.
1 Indemnity triggers depend on the actual losses of the sponsor which implies that no basis risk for the sponsor results but the investors are opposed to information asymmetries in terms of moral hazard. This can be reduced or eliminated if non-indemnity triggers are applied. However, in this case there occurs basis risk for the sponsor (Cummins et al. (2004) ). Analyzing the trade o between basis risk and moral hazard, it is argued in the literature that CAT bonds with indemnity triggers have higher premiums and are less traded compared to CAT bonds with non-indemnity trigger mechanisms (Cummins and Weiss (2009); Doherty (2000) ; Dubinsky and Laster (2003) ). On a relatively small data set, Dieckmann (2011) nds empirical evidence for the assumption that indemnity triggered CAT bonds are imposed with an additional premium. In contrast, Berge (2005) does not identify a signicant inuence of the applied trigger mechanism. In addition, Carpenter (2007) states that several disadvantages for both sponsor and investor are associated with the indemnity trigger. The rating process takes longer compared to other trigger mechanisms, and a more detailed risk analysis is necessary resulting in a longer preparation phase than when applying a non-indemnity trigger. However, market developments show that the indemnity trigger has regained importance in the last years. Cummins and Weiss (2009) assume that this development is due to a special payment structure included in the CAT bond contract. Here, both sponsor and investor share the risk proportionally above the trigger level. This is referred to as incentive provisions. However, Cummins (2008) points out that even if this structure is chosen, the problem of moral hazard remains. In compliance with the literature we expect the trigger hypothesis.
Trigger hypothesis (H1): CAT bonds with indemnity trigger are imposed by investors with higher risk premiums than CAT bonds with non-indemnity triggers.
The peril can be distinguished with regard to the peril type and with regard to the number of securitized perils which can be only one peril or multiple perils. Apparently, this can be done also for the region of the peril. Banks (2004) nds that the number of multiple peril bonds is increasing. Carpenter (2007) states that especially sponsors like to insure as many peril types as possible by one CAT bond due to reduced transaction costs and the sharing of limits for several risk regions. Instead, investors tend to prefer single peril CAT bonds. That enables them to buy the CAT bond which ts best to their investment strategy. Berge (2005) nds empirical evidence that the premium of the CAT bond declines if only one risk type is insured. Summarizing, we assume the complexity hypothesis.
Complexity hypothesis (H2): An increasing number of peril types or peril regions is opposed by investors with higher risk premiums.
The catastrophe risk that arises when securitizing dierent perils is examined by specialized rms. After the catastrophe risk has been determined, the rating process starts.
Because CAT bonds are fully collateralized, the rating is mainly done by analyzing the probability that a triggering event will occur (Cummins (2008) ). Therefore, the rating agencies basically rely on the catastrophe risk assessment as established by risk modeling rms because the rating agencies are not originally specialized in catastrophe risk assessment. However, it is questionable whether a rating process is independent and reliable if it is based on provided risk models (Anders (2005) ). Krutov (2010) 
Macroeconomic and Event Hypotheses
It is often stated in the literature that CAT bonds are attractive for investors because they are if at all lowly correlated with other asset classes. For instance , Litzenberger et al. (1996) nd that catastrophes are lowly correlated with security market returns.
Thus, instruments with a catastrophe related payment structure are suitable for diversication for investors. Furthermore, Galeotti et al. (2012) could not identify any correlation between nancial markets and the CAT bond market, although it has to be stated that they analyzed only issue data. In contrast, Dieckmann (2011) Cummins (2008) states that the assumption of independence between capital markets and the CAT bond market only holds in normal market situations. If a natural mega-catastrophe such as hurricane Katrina occurs, both the CAT bond market and the capital markets are aected. He suggests that under consideration of huge natural catastrophe events, there might be a correlation between capital markets and the CAT bond market due to lower prices for securities on capital markets and higher premiums for CAT bonds. In addition, Krutov (2010) states that the zero-beta assumption was rst questioned after hurricane Katrina and could become completely invalid after another mega-catastrophe such as an earthquake in California.
In the past, particularly hurricanes caused severe losses to insurance companies. Hur- 
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In addition, simulation studies predict that even more severe hurricanes might occur in the future due to climate change and related problems (Banks (2004) ). Lane and Mahul (2008) nd that wind perils in the United States which include hurricanes are imposed by the market with higher risk premiums than other perils. Cummins and Weiss (2009) state that premiums and expected losses rose signicantly after hurricane Katrina. However, it is not apparent whether increasing premiums have been observed on the whole CAT bond market or only CAT bonds that insure hurricane perils have been imposed with higher premiums by the market. Thus, although the expected loss should reect the risk appropriately and although the risk assessment has been adjusted after hurricane Katrina, especially for hurricane perils investors tend to doubt the accurate modeling of risks.
The situation concerning earthquakes is somehow dierent. Although earthquakes cause severe losses for the overall economy, they are less insured than hurricane perils. However, Munich Re (2012) states that earthquake perils will be more insured and securitized after the devastating Tohoku earthquake in 2011. Furthermore, the market awaits new results on earthquake risk modeling (Carpenter (2012) ). Because our data set does not consider the eects of the Tohoku earthquake suciently, we do not analyze this eect.
Summarizing, we assume that there is a correlation between the CAT bond market and capital markets in case of mega-catastrophes. However, it is not obvious how the CAT bond market reacts after such a catastrophe. Altogether, we assume the following natural catastrophe hypothesis for the case of hurricanes.
Natural catastrophe hypothesis (H5): Premiums of CAT bonds that insure hurricane perils increase after a mega-hurricane occurred.
We do not only analyze the occurrence of natural mega-catastrophes but also of the recent nancial crisis triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Krutov (2010) suppose that there were high correlations between capital markets and the CAT bond market in the course of the nancial crisis. Lane and Beckwith (2009) during the nancial crisis than comparable corporate bonds. They conclude that CAT bonds seem to be largely independent of other securities on capital markets. However, it seems plausible to assume that the ight to quality that can be observed in nancial crises also aects the CAT bond market and leads to increased risk premiums. Altogether, we formulate the nancial crisis hypothesis. Financial crisis hypothesis (H6): If a nancial crisis occurs, the positive dependency between corporate credit spreads and CAT bond premiums increases.
Usually, CAT bonds have longer maturities than traditional reinsurance. While CAT bonds have an average maturity of about three years, reinsurance contracts last about one year. Therefore, the sponsor of a CAT bond is protected against cyclical behavior of the reinsurance market (Cummins (2008) ). Furthermore, traditional reinsurance markets are aected by capacity shortage after a catastrophe which drives prices (Froot (2001) ).
For instance, after hurricane Katrina occurred, the traditional reinsurance market tightened due to capacity shortage, and prices rose. Although the CAT bond market is not aected by these market imperfections, it showed the same behavior. Cummins and Weiss (2009) nd two reasons for this development. First, the risk assessment of CAT bonds is questioned after a mega-catastrophe. Second, expertise is required to participate on the CAT bond market. Thus, if the demand for CAT bonds shifts after a catastrophe, new market participants need to build expertise before participating on the CAT bond market.
Consequently, the premiums increase due to shortage of expertise instead of shortage of capital on the traditional reinsurance market (Cummins and Weiss (2009) ). In addition,
CAT bonds can be regarded as an alternative to traditional reinsurance (Finken and Laux (2009) ). This would imply that the premiums on both markets should behave similarly.
Against this background, we formulate our reinsurance hypothesis. Reinsurance hypothesis (H7): There exists a positive inuence of traditional reinsurance premiums on CAT bond premiums. (2003)). Over time, the dealers who provided secondary market quotes changed slightly (Lane and Beckwith (2006 , 2009 , 2010 ). For the published averaged market indications, bid-ask spreads are averaged and these averaged spreads are averaged again for all dealers. The information on the applied trigger mechanisms and perils has been collected from Aon Beneld Securities, S&P and the online portal ARTEMIS.
From the original data set, several CAT bonds are eliminated. First, we removed several transactions for which the expected loss, the peril type or the rating is missing because we assume these factors to be essential components of the CAT bond premium. data is implausible, for instance, because the expected loss does not equal the product of probability of rst loss and the conditional expected loss.
When examining secondary market premiums for CAT bonds, apparently the problem of seasonality arises for all peril types except earthquakes. We outline this problem for hurricanes. During the hurricane season, the secondary market premiums increase due to a higher probability of a triggering event compared to non-hurricane seasons. In addition, if a CAT bond that securitizes hurricanes matures after the hurricane season, obviously the premiums will decline heavily in the preceding quarters. In order to avoid such seasonal uctuations, we eliminate secondary market premiums for perils other than earthquake if the remaining time to maturity deviates from a multiple of a full year. of the probability of rst loss (PFL) for the CAT bond and the conditional expected loss (CEL) by means of EL = PFL · CEL. In insurance economics, the EL of a non-negative random loss variable can be interpreted as a lower bound for the premium in order to avoid insolvency of the insurance company. Thus, it is an important parameter of the CAT bond premium.
In order to measure the inuence of trigger mechanisms on the CAT bond premium, we build the dummy variable Trigger Indemnity, that is dened as follows:
0, if a non-indemnity trigger is applied.
(1)
The non-indemnity trigger consists of the parametric trigger with about 47 percent, the industry index trigger with about 33 percent, the hybrid trigger with about 12 percent, and the modeled loss trigger with about 8 percent.
We build several variables in connection with the peril. 
4
The initial data set contains rating information from S&P, Fitch and Moody's. These ratings are converted to a point scale where an increase of one point reects a rating which is one notch worse. If there is more than one rating, the average rating is computed from the point scales. On the basis of this average rating, we determine the rating letter (AAA, AA,..., B), which is relevant for our empirical analysis.
We measure liquidity by maturity and volume of the CAT bond. The maturity is provided in the initial data set as total maturity at issue in terms of months. We keep this information in the variable Maturity in our data set. In addition, we determine the variable Time to Maturity (TTM), which measures the maturity which is left at the time of observation. The volume of the CAT bond is measured in terms of the natural logarithm of volume.
Macroeconomic Variables
In order to analyze whether there is an inuence of capital market developments on CAT 
5 The rate on line is commonly dened as premium divided by the insured limit. can not arm with certainty, which of the events aected the CAT bond markets at that time. This will be analyzed subsequently.
Descriptive Statistics
In Table 1 and Maturity, we report the statistics on deal level. The macroeconomic variables are reported quarterly for the S&P500 and yearly for the Reins. Index.
It can be observed that the mean of premiums is about four times the mean of EL.
The variables Number of Locations and Number of Perils indicate that typically less diverse regions than diverse peril types are insured in one CAT bond. In addition, the range of values of the variable log(Volume) varies between 0.96 and 6.47, measured in USD million. Furthermore, the typical CAT bond has a maturity of 36 month, which indicates that maturities of CAT bonds are signicantly higher than maturities of traditional reinsurance. In Table 3 the correlations between the above described variables are presented. 
Benchmark
In order to analyze how much fraction of variance can maximally be explained by bond specic or time-dependent variables, we explain the CAT bond premium by xed eects as follows:
X i refers to bond xed eects meaning that dummy variables are included for every bond. Consequently, an intercept for every bond is generated. X t refers to time xed eects which can be quarterly or yearly. For every unit of time a dummy variable is included. Finally, u it refers to the error term that varies over bond and time.
In Table 4 the results of the benchmark analysis on the basis of equation (5) are presented. The goodness-of-t of the models is measured by the R 2 which is determined on the basis of pooled OLS estimates. It can be interpreted as the part of variation in the dependent variable premium it that is explained by the explanatory variables. In model (I.1) we consider bond xed eects only, thus X t = 0. The R 2 of this analysis is 87.1 percent. Thus, a great part of premium variation can be explained by CAT bond specic information. In model (I.2) not only bond xed eects X i but also quarter xed eects X t are considered. The corresponding R 2 is 95 percent. When replacing quarter xed eects by year xed eects, the R 2 is only sligthly lower with 92.3 percent. In comparison, time eects measured by quarter or year are of lower relevance than bond eects for the explanation of premium variance. The same is true for inuencing factors that vary over both bond and time as these can explain at most the remaining 5 percent of premium variation. The above stated results have two implications for our subsequent analysis. First, we only consider year xed eects instead of quarter xed eects because the R 2 remains very high when replacing quarter xed eects by year xed eects. Second, we apply random eects models to reveal which inuencing factors determine the CAT bond premium. We consider random eects models of the following form
for i = 1, ..., n CAT bonds and t = 1, ..., T dierent points of time. X i refers to CAT bond specic variables that are not aected by time while X it refers to variables that consider time eects as well. X t comprises variables that depend on time only. Note that the unobservable individual eect a i and the error term that varies over time u it are assumed to be random but no distribution function is assumed, thus a i ∼ IID(0, σ 2 a ) and
In addition, it is assumed that all explanatory variables are independent of a i and u it for all i, t. Under these assumptions, the random eects estimator is consistent and asymptotically ecient. (Baltagi (2005); Wooldridge (2009) 
Analysis of the Expected Loss
We analyze the inuence of the expected loss on the CAT bond premium in the models of Table 5 . In model (II.1) we only consider the expected loss as a premium determining factor. We nd that, in addition to a constant value, the average CAT bond premium is about two times the expected loss. In the next model (II.2) we include year xed eects to account for dierent absolute risk premiums in time and nd that the adj. R 2 increases signicantly to 64.07 percent. In addition, we include the interaction eect of EL and year in model (II.3) to account for dierent relative risk premiums in time. The R 2 increases slightly compared to the previous specication. However, the hypothesis that the interaction coecients equal zero can be rejected on a 99.9 percent level. Thus, the variables of the interaction eect of EL and year are jointly signicant.
In the next step, we replace year xed eects by the event dummies Katrina and Lehman. Using this substitution in specication (II.4), we observe that the R 2 remains at the same level. Thus, it is reasonable to use these event variables instead of time xed eects. Having identied the interaction eect of EL and year and the event dummies as reasonable variables, we will use them in the following models in addition to the EL and further factors.
Analysis of CAT Bond Specic Variables
The objective of this section is the verication of CAT bond specic hypotheses. Therefore, we use the interaction eect of EL and year and the event dummies that have been constituted in the previous section as control variables in every model of Table 6 . Model (III.1) is only reported for comparison as it is identical to model (II.4) of Table 5 . Next, we include CAT bond specic variables X i that deal with trigger mechanisms and perils.
It can be observed that the adj. R 2 with an amount of 77.47 percent is signicantly higher for model (III.2) than for model (III.1). Finally, we include variables X i regarding rating, maturity and volume of the CAT bond. Note, that Time to Maturity is a CAT bond specic variable that varies over time, and thus is of type X it . The adj. R 2 of model (III.3) is slightly higher than the one of model (III.2).
We can not conrm the trigger hypothesis (H1). In neither model specication we nd a signicant inuence of the dummy variable `Trigger Indemnity. In addition, the coefcient is close to zero so that the eect is economically insignicant, too. Thus, we have strong support for rejecting the trigger hypothesis. This implies that market imperfections are not imposed by investors with additional premium components. Probably, the above mentioned risk sharing mechanism between sponsor and investor that is included in most indemnity CAT bonds remedies the problem of moral hazard suciently. Furthermore, it seems to be important for sponsors to avoid basis risk by applying indemnity trigger Locations even has a higher coecient and is more signicant than the variable Number of Types. Thus, investors tend to prefer CAT bonds that securitize perils in the same region. In addition, they prefer CAT bonds with a lower number of dierent peril types.
Concerning the peril location, we nd that perils that are insured in the European Union, in Japan or other regions, have signicantly lower premiums than CAT bonds securitizing events in North America. Furthermore, CAT bonds that insure hurricane events have signicantly higher premiums compared to earthquake insuring bonds. This Our results support the rating hypothesis (H3). We nd that investors demand signicantly higher premiums for CAT bonds with lower ratings. The coecients for the rating are increasing as the rating letters decline. Thus, despite all points of criticism concerning the rating of CAT bonds, investors use the rating as additional information for their risk assessment.
Moreover, we nd support for the liquidity hypothesis (H4b), i.e. investors do not demand a liquidity premium for CAT bonds. We measure liquidity by the variables Maturity, TTM and log(Volume). Neither of these variables has a signicant inuence on CAT bond premiums. This is conform with results of other empirical analyses. Although there is theoretical motivation for a liquidity premium, there is no empirical evidence for the case of CAT bonds.
Analysis of Macroeconomic Factors
The eects of macroeconomic factors on the CAT bond premium are analyzed in the models presented in Table 7 . For an easier comparison of results we repeat model (III.3) in the rst column of the table. We use several CAT bond specic variables as control variables in addition to the interaction eect of EL and year and the event dummies
Katrina and Lehman, namely the variables Trigger Indemnity, Number of Locations, Number of Types, Peril Type, Peril Region, Maturity, TTM and log(Volume). In Table   7 we only report the variables that are of interest for the following models.
We include the macroeconomic variables S&P500 and Reins. Index in model (IV.2).
It can be observed that there is a signicantly positive inuence for the yearly return of the reinsurance index and a signicantly negative inuence for the quarterly return of the S&P500 on the premium. The signicantly positive eect of the variable Reins. Index remains stable for the following analyses. Thus, we nd evidence for our reinsurance cycle hypothesis (H7), which implies that the development of reinsurance premiums has a positive impact on the development of CAT bond premiums.
The coecient of the variable S&P500 is slightly negative. However, if the capital market variable Spreads Corp is included in model (IV.3), the coecient of the S&P500 becomes positive and insignicant. This results from the negative correlation of the two variables which is -0.14 according to Table 3 . Consequently, in model (IV.3) the eects of capital market developments are represented by the variable Spreads Corp. The coecient of the variable Spreads Corp is signicantly positive. Simultaneously, the inuence of the rating variables declines, which can be observed by two facts. First, the coecients of dierent rating classes are lower compared to model (IV.1) and (IV.2).
Second, the level of signicance of the rating variables declines in model (IV.3).
There are two possible arguments for the eect that the inuence of the rating declines.
First, corporate credit spreads could only be a substitute of the rating class. Second, corporate credit spreads could really add information to the required premium, which would be evidence for a correlation between capital markets and CAT bond premiums. The background of the substitution argument is that CAT bond premiums have been matched with the corresponding corporate credit spreads of the same rating class. Thus, the eect of a lower rating on the premium could be included in this variable. However, if the development of corporate credit spreads over time was not important for the premium, the eect of the rating from model (IV.1) and model (IV.2) should remain stable and the coecient of the variable Spreads Corp should not be signicant. Though, we observe the opposite eect, i.e. the coecient of corporate credit spreads are highly signicant and the rating is largely insignicant. Consequently, we can conclude that the development of corporate credit spreads over time adds information to the required premium. Thus, we nd strong evidence that there is a dependency between capital markets and CAT bond premiums. In the next section, it is analyzed whether this eect remains valid over time or if there are changes in the case of the nancial crisis.
Analysis of Catastrophe Events
Subsequently, we analyze the impact of natural catastrophes and the nancial crisis on risk premiums. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 8 . We include the interaction eect of EL and year, the yearly return of the S&P500, the quarterly return of the reinsurance index, and several CAT bond specic variables, namely the Trigger Indemnity, Number of Locations, Number of Types, Peril Region, Rating, Maturity, Time
To Maturity, and the natural logarithm of volume as control variables in every analysis.
In the rst column of Table 8 We nd strong evidence for our natural catastrophe hypothesis (H5) in the case of hurricane Katrina. It can be observed in model (V.I) that the coecient of the dummy variable Katrina is highly signicantly positive, which indicates that there is a general increase of the risk perception on the CAT bond market. However, it is possible that this eect can be attributed to CAT bonds that have been issued before Katrina. Potentially, the secondary market premiums for these CAT bonds do not rise due to an increased risk perception but due to a higher probability of default if events are treated cumulatively in the contracts, as we argued in Section 3. Altogether, the implications of these results are as follows. Hurricane Katrina did not lead to higher premiums for all types of perils in general. Instead, only after hurricane Katrina occurred, hurricane perils were imposed with higher risk premiums compared to earthquake perils due to an increased risk perception for hurricanes. In addition, it has been veried that this eect is not completely driven by CAT bonds that have been issued before Katrina and, thus, could actually be aected by the losses of hurricane Katrina. This is conform with our natural catastrophe hypothesis (H6).
We nd strong evidence for our nancial crisis hypothesis (H6) by including the inter- It has to be stated that the third largest hurricane since 1980 hurricane Ike occurred at the same time as the Lehman event. The purpose of model (V.5) is to verify whether the identied eects can really be assigned to the Lehman event or whether they are caused by hurricane Ike. If the eects were caused by hurricane Ike, we would expect that the risk perception for the aected hazard increases after the event as it has been identied in the case of hurricane Katrina. Therefore, we include the interaction eect of Lehman and Hurricane and the interaction eect of Lehman and Wind. Neither of these eects has a signicant impact on CAT bond premiums. Thus, we do not nd evidence of the natural catastrophe hypothesis (H5) in the case of hurricane Ike. This implies that the risk perception for hurricanes does not signicantly increase after hurricane Ike and the previously described eects can indeed be assigned to the Lehman event.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we have analyzed which factors determine the CAT bond premium. In addition, we have analyzed whether and how natural catastrophes or nancial crises aect the CAT bond premiums. We verify several CAT bond specic factors that determine the CAT bond premium. Furthermore, we nd strong evidence that the nancial crisis signicantly aected CAT bond premiums. Concerning natural catastrophes we nd that after hurricane Katrina, the risk perception for hurricanes rose.
The analysis of the impact of CAT bond specic variables on premiums reveals that the premiums increase if the deal complexity increases in terms of number of insured peril types or regions. In addition, our results support the assumption that investors use rating information for their investment decision. They demand additional premium components if the rating declines. Our results do not verify the expectation in the literature that CAT bonds using the indemnity trigger are imposed by the market with an additional premium.
Therefore, we conclude that problems which arise due to asymmetric risk aversion are not of signicant importance for the premium of a CAT bond. This could result from incentive provisions that are included in most indemnity trigger CAT bonds. Moreover, there is no empirical evidence for a liquidity premium measured in terms of maturity and volume for the case of CAT bond premiums.
We nd that there is a positive dependency of the reinsurance cycle and CAT bond premiums. Thus, CAT bond premiums do have a cyclical behavior that is similar to the reinsurance cycle. Furthermore, we nd strong evidence for a positive dependency of capital market developments measured by corporate credit spreads and CAT bond premiums. This positive dependency strengthens signicantly after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers that triggered the nancial crisis.
Concerning the impact of great natural catastrophe, we have rst analyzed the eects of hurricane Katrina. We nd that premiums for hurricane insuring CAT bonds are signicantly higher than CAT bonds that insure other perils. However, we identify that this eect only arises after hurricane Katrina. In addition, we verify that this eect is not driven by CAT bonds that are actually aected by hurricane Katrina, i.e. bonds that have been issued before the event. Thus, we can conclude that after hurricane Katrina has occurred, CAT bonds with hurricane perils are imposed by investors with additional premium components due to an increased risk perception for hurricanes. However, we do not observe that market participants react with a general mistrust in reported ELs that are based on catastrophe risk models.
Second, we have analyzed the impact of hurricane Ike which occurred at the same time as the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Here, we cannot identify a signicant eect on premiums of hurricane insuring CAT bonds that can be assigned to hurricane Ike. Thus, it seems that investors believe that the adjusted risk assessment after Katrina suciently accounts for future catastrophes.
An important implication of our results is that not only future natural but also future nancial crises might aect CAT bond premiums signicantly. Our results revealed that there is a positive dependency between corporate credit spreads and CAT bond premiums.
Hence, CAT bonds cannot be regarded as zero-beta securities. This dependency even strengthens signicantly in the case of the nancial crisis. Thus, investors should be aware that there are correlations between CAT bonds and other securities that become even stronger when diversication eects are most valuable, i.e. in extreme market conditions.
Moreover, we have veried several CAT bond specic variables as premium determining factors. An implication of these various factors is that it seems to be important to standardize CAT bonds. Standardization would unify the premium determination and, consequently, uncertainties in premium calculation could be reduced. Additionally, a standardization of CAT bonds could attract less sophisticated investors, too. Both reasons, the smaller uncertainty and the higher demand, would potentially lead to lower premiums and, thus, be benecial especially from the originator's point of view.
An important research question addresses the Tohoku earthquake. We could not analyze this event because our data did not reect the impact of the earthquake suciently. If there is enough data, it should be analyzed whether the risk premiums increase after the Tohoku earthquake and whether this has to be attributed to a general mistrust in reported ELs or if this eect can be attributed to earthquake perils only.
